![]() VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs) not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. Morality/Feinberg: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984(1): 9). (4) are there any conditions under which liberals justify coercion thatĭo not fall into one of the above categories (1990) (1)? Feinberg convincingly shows that, when carefully examined, Mill’s radical proposal – that only harm to others can justify social interference – is implausible, but nevertheless is plausibly construed as the core of a liberal social morality (see further Gaus, 1999 (2): Part II). (3) When individuals are unable to make fully voluntary choices, can coercion then be employed to stop them from harming themselves (1986) (1)? And ![]() (2) Does Millian morality allow coercion to prevent acts that, while not harmful to others, are offensive to some (1985) (1)? Mill/Feinberg/Gaus: The classic work on the harm principle, and more generally on this Millian approach to political justice, is Joel Feinberg’s masterful four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984–90) (1). Joel Feinberg on Mill - Dictionary of Arguments Gaus I 109 ![]()
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